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Increasing concerns about the rise of terrorist attacks 
The terrorist attack in Dhaka’s international and diplomatic enclave Gulshan at the beginning 
of this month, which left at least 21 victims of different nationalities dead, was followed 
within less than a week by a bomb attack during the largest Eid congregation (Eid-ul-Fitr the 
greatest festival of the Muslims) at Sholakia ground at Kishoreganj, killing at least four 
people and leaving several people injured. Once again, the Islamic State (IS) claimed 
responsibility, at least directly for the attack in Gulshan. Regarding the Kishoreganj bombing, 
there are severe indications that it got inspired by IS since it seems to be in close relation with 
an IS propaganda video just released two days before. Nevertheless, the government officials 
are following the old rhetoric of continuing to deny the presence of foreign militant groups on 
the country’s soil. 
Subsequently, after witnessing these two dramatic terrorist attacks within one week, many 
people in Bangladesh are asking what happens next? Is the situation getting worse? Or will 
the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) be able to contain or even eradicate the threat of 
terrorism? Is the GoB able to protect the fundamental rights -and even the lives- of its citizen? 
Is terrorism homegrown or imported from outside by international Jihadist organizations? 
What must be done to ensure that Bangladesh stays secular and democratic as envisaged at the 
country’s foundation? Taking questions and related concerns into account, many observers 
starting to demand more concrete, even a completely new approach to fighting terrorism and 
to protect the life of the people as well as the basic principles of Bangladesh’s state and 
society. 
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What happened: A major ‘crackdown’ on Islamist Extremists and the Jihadi response  
 
Last month, Bangladesh’s security forces carried out a nationwide crackdown on radical 
Islamists in the country. The main part of the campaign was running over several days 
including thousands of police and paramilitary personnel and led to the arrest of more than 
11,300 people. This security operation has to be seen as the response of rising international 
and domestic critic regarding the apparent inaction of the GoB during a wave of brutal 
assassinations in the country happening before the Gulshan and Kishoreganj attacks. The 
victims were secular and liberal writers and thinkers (especially bloggers), university 
professors, foreign aid workers, gay rights activists and religious minorities including Hindus, 
Buddhists, Christians and members of the Shiite community. After quite some time, Prime 
Minister Sheikh Hasina’s administration reacted and facilitated a massive clampdown to 
tackle the challenge of the Islamist threat. Nevertheless, critic remained and the accusation 
was made that Ms. Sheikh Hasina used the counter-terrorism activity to keep the opposition in 
check. Furthermore, some analysts were questioning the performance of the crackdown, 
which produced large numbers of arrests, but only a few (approximately 150) of them were 
concrete radical Islamist subjects. Most of the latter groups were lower rank members of 
Islamist organizations and petty criminals, but top Jihadists got largely spared by the raids. 
Against this backdrop, the police stated that “none of those arrested is believed to be a high-
level operator who might have organized or ordered attacks”.  
 
However, it would be naïve to think the Islamist threat was all-clear by then. In contrast, one 
should rather expect a harsh reaction by the militant Islamists who want to show their still 
available capacities. Subsequently, despite the crackdown many people, especially 
independent intellectuals, in Bangladesh are still anxious that the religious fanatics will 
continue to terrorize Bangladesh’s state and society, turning the country into a Jihadist hub.  
 
As such one can state that after the Gulshan attack on July 1 and 2 and the Kishoreganj 
bombing on July 7, doubts regarding the efficacy of the counter-terrorist campaign of the GoB 
seemed to be confirmed. Following two arguments will be brought forward here: Firstly, that 
both events are clear indications not only for the existence but also of the rise of international 
Jihadism in the South Asian country. Secondly, that there is a correlation between the 
emergence of Islamist extremism and the predominant political culture in Bangladesh. This 
rationale leads to the core puzzle: How this could happen? 
2
How this could happen: the puzzle  
 
Basically, there are two fundamental social and political trajectories creating the above-
mentioned correlation: The process of political polarization and the process of Islamisation. 
 
The process of political polarization 
 
To begin with, Bangladesh’s development in all spheres of state and society suffers from a 
deeply entrenched process of political polarization. Later one finds its expression is an 
unfortunate political culture which is determined by extraordinary polarization, hostility, and 
politics of revenge between the two major political parties, Awami League (AL) and 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). By experiencing this, political actors see democracy as a 
zero-sum game marked by a destructive ‘tit-for-tat’ strategy in order to achieve partisan 
objectives which are prioritized over national concerns. In this context, not only political 
institutions and society are highly politicized but also the whole governmental machinery. 
Appointments in politics and administration are based more on loyalty, obedience, obeisance, 
charisma, and kinship, rather than on performance, merits, and skills. As a result, many of the 
state agencies remain ineffective or absent in rural/remote areas which are yet just another 
nail in the coffin of already poor and stagnating governance. This has also enabled endemic 
corruption to spread like a wildfire. In addition to that, the undemocratic nature, 
unprofessional practice, and behavior of political parties contribute to the semblance of 
instability as well. Political parties possess a weak organizational structure, lack internal 
democracy and a code of ethics. They suffer from a high degree of intra-party factional feuds 
leading to numerous fissions (and fusions) in the past. Excessive personal leadership cult, 
dynastic rule, patron-client relations (clientelism) as well as politics of patronage constitute 
other negative traits of the country’s polity. At the same time, criminalization of politics, 
coercion as an acceptable mode of governance and widespread use of violence are 
punctuating the political landscape negatively. Subsequently, politicians, rely on musclemen 
(mastaans/goondas) to achieve goals in an unrestricted struggle for power. Therefore, one 
can state that in Bangladesh, increasing political radicalization and the rise of Jihadism are 
closely connected with Bangladesh’s institutional dysfunctionality and destructive political 
culture. 
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The process of Islamisation  
 
Basically one must state that the killings of secular thinkers in Bangladesh and the latest terror 
attacks are only the gloomy peak of growing Jihadi influence in the country. Since the early 
1990s, a silent but steady process of Islamisation  started in the country. The breeding ground 
for this process was prepared by the country’s military rulers, General Ziaur Rahman (1975-
1981) and General H.M. Ershad (1982-1990). During both autocratic governments, far-
reaching constitutional amendments were introduced which undermined the institutional 
bulwark, i.e. the principles of secularism and democracy, against a potential Islamist takeover. 
More concretely, Ziaur and Ershad diluted the secular principles in the constitution in order to 
gain legitimacy by playing the religious card. They were undoubtedly inspired by their 
Pakistani peer, General Zia-ul Haq (1977-1988), under whose dictatorial regime Pakistan 
descended into a marsh of Islamic fundamentalism. By anchoring Islam in the constitution 
and putting religion at the center of the political discourse, Bangladesh was effectively 
transformed into an Islamic state. As a result, Islamist parties have been able to incrementally 
appropriate room in the political arena, despite the fact that they did not enjoy much general 
public support. It is interesting to mention, that in this direction Pakistan serves as a crucial 
point of reference: the fact that Islamist parties do not get many votes percentage-wise does 
not automatically imply that they are marginalized when it comes to exercising political 
influence and access to state resources. Here, aggressive political behavior combined with 
extra-judicial measures (e.g. black mailing, target killings, major terrorist activities) are used 
as a compensation for the lack of electoral support. 
 
The high level of Islamist penetration of state and society was further enhanced during the 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) governments (1991–1996, 2001–2006). Not only were 
using state resources to promote their ‘anti-secular revolution’ but also to push the 
entrenchment of Islamic fundamentalist elements deeply into the political-administrative 
structure of the country. Today, Islamisation is not a silent process anymore: it is loud, 
aggressive and it has reached the center of power politics in Dhaka. In the given context, in 
2013 Jihadists violently demanded the public execution of atheist bloggers and called for 
new (blasphemy) laws to combat writing critical of Islam and the Prophet Muhammad. This 
process of Islamisation poses an existential threat to everything that Bangladesh stands for, 
especially its freedom struggle of 1971: democracy, freedom of mind and secularism 
understood as religious tolerance.  
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 In sum, the rise of Islamist extremism was possible, besides the political culture and other 
factors, because of a lack of a coherent and stringent strategy against religious 
fundamentalism. The few measures carried out by the current government to contain the 
Islamist threats remain ineffective, especially if one looks at the mobilizing capacities of the 
Islamists and the on-going operations of ‘officially’ banned organizations.  
 
Where to go: Conceptualizing a political solution   
 
In consequence of above mention political trajectories and taking the rise of Jihadi attacks as 
well as the latest major crackdown into account, one can make following statements: 
 
Firstly, we have no specific ‘Bangladesh way’ regarding strategies and methods of terrorist 
attacks. After a series of killings from secular writers and thinkers in the country, some 
analyst identified a certain level of ‘exceptionalism’ in terrorist attacks in Bangladesh: instead 
of large scale assaults in order to create maximum fear and threat perception (especially by 
the use of suicide terrorists) one can find a strategic selection and termination of people which 
are identified as ‘anti-Islamic’. The latter way of ‘silencing of any opposition’ towards 
Islamic extremist way of organizing state and society got portrayed as the ‘new face of 
terrorism’ in Bangladesh. Obviously, such a rationale helps also to support the rhetoric of the 
GoB that the current ways of Jihadist attacks are carried out by domestic groups and are not 
conducted by international terror organization like IS or Al Qaeda. Having this rationale in 
mind, the latest two attacks must be seen in the same line of attacks world-wide which are 
either directly organized or inspired by international terror groups. Consequently, the GoB 
should finally recognize that the international Jihadi movement arrived in Bangladesh. 
 
Secondly, Bangladesh needs more than sporadic, large-scale police actions, especially if later 
one appears rather as imprudent than strategically well planned like the crackdown on militant 
Islamists last month. Another example that the GoB is still not prepared to react adequately 
and/or to in time is Operation Thunderbolt, a counter-terrorist action which led finally to an 
end of the Gulshan carnage which was initiated only 10 hours later after the begin of the 
attack. The reasons for this late reaction are not only complex and manifold but symptomatic 
for the GoB’s difficulties in dealing with terrorism: long decision-making processes by the 
responsible authorities, lack of civil-military coordination, insufficient logistics, and military 
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equipment are definitely some of them. In order to solve some of these major problems, the 
GoB needs a complex and coherent counter-terrorism strategy which includes tough military 
options like the latest crackdown on Islamists or operation thunderbolt. But latter ones must 
be embedded in an ‘overall political solution’ to eradicate all kinds of Islamist radicalization 
and influence in the country. 
 
Thirdly, there is obviously no certain measure, or strategy with a specific set of actions that 
could represent the ‘best solution’ in tackling the terrorist threat in any country. As such, 
Bangladesh needs a coherent and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy which includes 
especially a political solution. Such a ‘political solution’ must consist of several components:  
 
a) The ‘fundamental aim’ to eradicate the conditions creating a favoring environment for 
religious fanatics.  
 
b) A ‘sustainable rapprochement’ between the two hostile political leaders Sheikh Hasina 
(AL) and Begum Khaleda Zia (BNP) to create a ‘conducive political environment’, and a 
‘constructive working relationship’ between government and opposition, and to end the 
disastrous extra-parliamentary activities to undermine the work of the GoB. The military 
formally proposed the idea of the minus-two formula, understood that both leaders have to 
leave the country, but such an option would rather enforce the political conflict than to calm it 
down.  
 
c) A ‘clear conviction (political will)’ and the subsequent formulation and implementation of 
a program to bounce-back Islamist leverage in the country’s constitutional and institutional-
administrative structure. In this context, the debate of the removal of a constitutional 
provision recognizing Islam as the official religion earlier this year was without an eminent 
step into the right direction. The fact that Bangladesh's High Court on Monday, March 28, 
rejected a respective petition, was unfortunate for Bangladesh’s transition towards liberal 
democracy, for several reasons:  
 
(I) it’s against the initial spirit of the constitution which is favoring secularism;    
 
(II) to declare a certain believe as state religion undermines the freedom of religion and 
expression, and contradicts the notion of liberal democracy;    
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(III) the way how the petition got rejected is against any rules and procedures in democratic 
governance. Within minutes, the petition got rejected without given the petitioner a chance to 
defend their case. Fourthly, the judgment gave ideological and judicial cover for further 
Islamisation of state and society, at the expense of the political leverage of secular forces. In 
sum, this decision of the highest court of Bangladesh will help to boost Islamism and Jihadi 
ideology in the country. Another essential part of a political solution is that the BNP must be 
forced to cut its ties with religious extremist political parties. Democracy cannot prevail if 
political parties, whose agenda it is to erode democracy, are at the forefront of formal and 
informal decision-making processes. 
 
Fourthly, a ‘clear conviction (political will)’ and the subsequent formulation and 
implementation of a program to strengthen the country’s Civil Society, especially to protect 
and promote Civil Society Organisations in order to strengthen secular and tolerant forces. In 
this context, any Civil Society agenda must include initiatives to protect the country’s ethnic 
and religious minorities and other vulnerable groups (like LGBTI).  
 
Fifthly, substantial social and economic reforms and subsequent concrete measures to uplift 
the living condition and future prospects of the people, especially for the youth. These 
includes also reforms in the educational sector, especially to reduce the leverage of the 
madrasas (Islamic religious schools). However, it is important to note, that many of the 
terrorists who carried out the latest attacks are from financially well-off families and are 
highly educated. This means that the Jihadi groups today are able to recruit people from all 
social classes, not only those feeling socially, economically or politically marginalized. 
Furthermore, it seems that the Jihadi groups invested much in new recruiting strategies and 
are able to reach not only poor students in madrasas but also rich ones in the leading private 
universities. It should be also noted that this is not a Bangladesh but rather a worldwide 
phenomenon. In sum, a political solution should not only focus on the reasons – which are 
extraordinary manifold – why “rich kids’’ are turning into terrorists, it must consist specific 
educational measures able to undermine the increasing successful propaganda strategies of the 
terror groups. 
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Last but not least, Bangladesh’s complete political elite (irrespective of which political camp) 
needs a substantial reassessment of its approach towards the international community in 
general and foreign relations in particular. Being two-times under foreign yoke -first under 
British colonial rule and then under West-Pakistani military administration (including martial 
law) which treated former East Pakistan as an ‘internal colony’- a certain cautiousness 
regarding any kind of foreign influence in domestic affairs is comprehensible. However, to 
find a political solution, the international community could play an important role, especially 
the European Union (EU). The EU should help to foster a dialogue between AL and BNP to 
work out a national consensus and create an avenue for a more inclusive politics to end 
violent radicalization. The dialogue should revolve around the issues of putting an end to the 
disruptive and stifling violence, to guarantee general human rights and the protection of all 
citizens, and to end the deadlock and generate trust and room for cooperation in order to re-
establish democratic norms and principles. In these context, regarding SADF in Brussels, the 
international community could “urge external donors (NGOs and/or non-EU countries) to re-
evaluate and monitor their flow of financial aid, development and assistance to Bangladesh so 
that it is not misused by the JeI [Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami] and its auxiliaries to augment 
their hazardous extremist impact on political life and secularism in Bangladesh”. 
 
Final thoughts  
 
In order to contain and to eradicate the Jihadi threat, Bangladesh’s elites must overcome 
domestic political rivalries to achieve a national consensus to formulate an overall concept for 
a political solution. Furthermore, the country needs a stringent engagement to promote the 
Civil Society to strengthen all democratic and secular forces is necessary. Later processes are 
demanding that the political decision-makers must overcome their ‘state of denial’ and finally 
enforce expeditious prosecution and punishment of militant religious extremism; as long as 
this is not achieved, Bangladesh risks falling even deeper into the clutches of Islamic 
fundamentalism. As such, it’s time that the GoB accept that its country has to face not only 
the threat of domestic but international Jihadism too. Last but not least, the GoB has to join 
hands with the international community on the basis of commonly accepted standards human 
rights, transparency, and accountability, to combat international terrorism on the basics. 
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